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Pervasive but difficult to quantify, volunteer work has been widely re- 
garded as a vital component of charitable activity in the United States. 
Despite the historical trend toward greater professionalism in public and 
private social-welfare agencies, volunteers have remained an important 
source of skilled labor in many organizations. A Gallup survey in 1981 es- 
timated that over half of  American adults and teenagers did some volun- 
teer work during the year, either for an organization or informally (Gallup 
Organization 1981, p. iv). Based on data from this and one other recent 
survey, Weitzman (1983) has estimated that the market value of  the time 
spent by volunteers is in the range of $54 to $65 billion in 1980 dollars.’ 
Although the proper valuation of volunteer time involves more than sim- 
ply applying market wage rates, such estimates suggest that the resource 
cost of volunteering is probably at least as large as  aggregate contributions 
of money, which totaled about $40 billion in 1980.2 
Recent federal administrations have made a special point to encourage 
volunteering. From John Kennedy’s call for VISTA and Peace Corps vol- 
unteers to Ronald Reagan’s establishment of a Presidential Task Force on 
Private Sector Initiatives, there has been an implicit understanding that 
volunteering may serve social goals more effectively or less expensively 
than government spending programs. President Reagan made this an ex- 
plicit part of his administration’s program: “Voluntarism is an essential 
part of our plan to give the government back to the people” (Washington 
Post, 8 October 1981). 
1.  $54 billion figure is based on estimates of  $31.9 billion for 1973, using the National 
Study of Philanthropy. The $65 billion figure uses the Gallup survey for 1981. See Weitzman 
1983, p. 270, table I. 
2. See, for example, Giving U.S.A.  1983, p. 36. 
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What defines charitable voluntary work? Normally, volunteers receive 
no pay, although they may receive reimbursement for expenses. Most vol- 
unteering is done under the auspices of private nonprofit organizations, 
but public agencies also make use of  volunteers. Surveys of volunteers 
usually ignore work for unions and professional societies, and some ex- 
clude work in religious organizations dealing primarily with worship and 
religious education. Another distinction is made between work done for 
organizations and help provided fnformally, such as helping neighbors. 
Since it is more difficult to measure precisely, such informal help is some- 
times excluded in measures of volunteer effort. Finally, there is no gener- 
ally accepted minimum amount of time or effort required to be classified 
as a volunteer. 
Despite these inevitable ambiguities, it is possible to get some idea of 
the extent of volunteering from recent surveys. In 1981 the Gallup organi- 
zation formulated two measures of volunteer effort for use in household 
surveys. In a survey taken in September, respondents were asked if they 
were “involved in any charity or social service activities, such as helping 
the poor, the sick or elderly.” By this measure, 29 percent of adults were 
volunteers, implying a total force of volunteers, cited above, of at least 40 
million Americans (“Americans Volunteer: A Profile” 1982, p. 21). In a 
March survey, on the other hand, volunteering was defined much more 
broadly to include all volunteer work for religious organizations as well as 
informal helping. By this measure 52 percent of adults, some 80 million in 
all, had volunteered during the previous year (Gallup Organization 198 1, 
pp. i-iv.;  Hodgkinson and Weitzman 1984, p. 26). Numbers such as this 
are often cited to illustrate the importance of voluntary action as an alter- 
native to government in dealing with social concerns. 
In recent years, however, there has been a growing concern that the 
number of  volunteers may be on the decline. Established nonprofit orga- 
nizations have reported reductions in the number of members and vglun- 
teers, particularly  among women. For example, the League of Women 
Voters reported a decline of about 8 percent in its membership between 
1978 and 1980 (Washington  Post, 23 May 1980). In the decade between 
1969 and 1979, the American Red Cross reportedly lost a third of its over 2 
million vo1unteers.l It is impossible to determine with much precision the 
overall decline in volunteers,  however, because comparable survey data 
over time are not available. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the effect of the tax structure 
on volunteer effort. This effect may be direct, for example, through de- 
ductions  for expenses incurred  in volunteering. Or it may be indirect, 
through the effect of  taxation on labor force participation and hours of 
3. Durham Morning Herald, 2 August 1981. See also McGuire and Weber  1982, p. 5; 
Washington  Post, 27 April 1980; and New York Times, 16 April 1978. 144  Volunteer Effort 
work. Another possible indirect effect is that the income tax may stimu- 
late volunteering  through  its encouragement of  monetary  gifts, which 
would be the case if contributions and volunteering are “complementary” 
goods. Section 4.1 presents tabulations on the extent of volunteering and 
characteristics of volunteers, and section 4.2 describes the federal tax pro- 
visions relevant to volunteer activity. Section 4.3 examines the question of 
the tax effects on volunteering within a simple economic model of individual 
choice. Sections 4.4 and 4.5  discuss econometric analyses of  volunteer 
work-the  former reviewing previous studies and the latter extending this 
work to look at the volunteer effort of women. The final section discusses 
the implications of theoretical and empirical work for tax policy. 
4.1  Extent and Characteristics of Volunteer Effort 
There is substantial variation in the kinds of  work done and the fre- 
quency of  volunteering by population groups. Table 4.1 provides detail 
about the kinds of organizations volunteers worked for during the year 
1981, where volunteering is defined broadly to include all volunteer work 
in religious congregations4 and informal helping. In fact, informal assis- 
tance and religious volunteering are the most frequently cited categories. 
Table 4.1  Percentage of  Adult  Men and Women Who Had Volunteered  in the 
Past Year, by Activity, 1981 










Arts and culture 
Work-related 
Informal/alone 
General fund raisers 
None 































Source: Gallup Organization, 1981, pp. 6-7. 
Note: Percentages sum to more than 100 percent because multiple responses were allowed 
4. Religious volunteering may be divided between work done in community and traditional 
social-welfare projects, and work done in connection with education, administration, and 
worship activities that are entirely within the religious domain  of  the congregation.  Al- 
though the former may be rooted in religious belief, it is often separated from the latter in 
classifying volunteer work. In table 4. I both types of work are included. 145  Volunteer Effort 
Informal volunteering, done apart from any organization and including 
such assistance as helping a neighbor with repairs and baking brownies for 
a scout group, was cited by 17 percent of men and 28 percent of women. Re- 
ligious volunteering was next with 16 and 22 percent, respectively. After 
these activities, women most often cited work in health and education, 
while men were most likely to work in recreational activities. From this 
tabulation, it is evident that men and women have somewhat different 
patterns of volunteer work. For both sexes, however, volunteering for re- 
ligious groups exceeds that for any other organizational area and corre- 
sponds to the predominance of religious giving in individuals’ contribu- 
tions of money. 
In order to examine variations in the rate of  volunteer work, table 4.2 
presents volunteering rates for men and women according to several de- 
mographic and economic characteristics. This table is based on a  1965 
survey that excluded political, informal, and strictly religious volunteer- 
ing. The overall rate of 16 percent is below the 29 percent figure for 1981 
cited above, but the definitions are not comparable. For men and women, 
volunteering reaches a peak in the 35 to 44 age bracket. At every age, 
women volunteer at higher rates, with the difference being greatest in the 
25 to 34 age group. Volunteering also varies by marital status, with mar- 
ried adults volunteering the most. The results for occupation reveal that 
men with high-skill occupations have very high rates of volunteering. In 
general, volunteering appears to be positively correlated to occupational 
status for both sexes. 
The tabulation  for labor  force participation in table 4.2 shows that 
women who are not in the labor force are more likely to volunteer than 
those who are, but this relationship is reversed for men. A more detailed 
breakdown of volunteer work by hours of paid work is given in table 4.3. 
Among men, those working from 1 to 34 hours per week volunteered the 
most at each age level, with those employed 35 hours or more per week be- 
hind them. Men not working volunteered the least. Among women, the 
pattern was less clear. For women over 35, those without a paying job 
were the most active volunteers, conforming to the traditional stereotype. 
For women under 35, those working less than 35 hours volunteered the 
most, reflecting perhaps the emergence of new patterns of labor force par- 
ticipation.  Women working 35 or more hours per week volunteered the 
least  .5  Indeed, housewives have constituted one traditional source of vol- 
5. The squeeze between job and volunteering is described by one woman: “While I work 
and am paid for 40 hours per week, earning a livelihood involves at least 50 total hours: one 
hour each midday and one hour daily commuting. In addition, I sleep 56 hours per week, 
prepare 1  I  meals weekly averaging one hour each, do minimum housework in 20 hours a 
week and shop for necessities one to three hours per week. From 168 hours per week  I’m 
down to less than 40 hours of  ‘disposable  time’ and haven’t hugged my son or husband. It is 
not true that ‘almost everyone  has time he can give’ ”  (letter of Jo Ann M. Crane, WullStreet 
Journal, 5 January 1982, p. 30). For another illustration, see the  Washington  Post, 23 April 
1980, p. B7. 146  Volunteer Effort 
Table 4.2  Percentage of  Adults Volunteering, by Sex and Other Characteristics, 
1965 
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Source: U.  S.  Department of Labor 1969, p. 6. 
Note: Excludes political, strictly religious, and informal volunteering. Covers the year end- 
ing November 1965. 
unteers. This appears to be changing, however, as a result of the recent in- 
crease in women’s labor force participation as well as hostility in the wom- 
en’s movement to traditional voluntary work.6 Because of the importance 
of this shift for overall volunteering, it is useful to consider tax effects on 
the labor force participation of women. 
Two further tabulations covering both men and women in 1981 are pre- 
sented in table 4.4. They show that volunteering rises with household in- 
come and family size. Economic theory suggests that the value of  time 
rises with both income and family size; thus the implicit cost of volunteer- 
6.  In 1971 and 1974 the National Organization of  Women endorsed resolutions against 
volunteering in preference to paid work for women (New York Times, 16 April 1978). 147  Volunteer Effort 
Table 4.3  Average Annual Hours of  Volunteer Work  by Employment, Age and 
Sex, 1973 
Age and Sex 
Unemployed  Employed  Employed 
or Not in  1 to 34 Hours  35 or More 
Labor Force  per Week  Hours per Week 
Women 
35 and under 
36 to 50 
Over 50 
Men 
35 and under 




















Note: Numbers of observation are given in parentheses. Volunteering was defined as unpaid 
work for religious and other charitable organizations. 
Source: Tabulations from National Study of Philanthropy. See Morgan, Dye, and Hybels 
1977 for a description of the data. 
ing would go up with both. Other forces may work in the opposite direc- 
tion, however. If volunteering is a normal good, demand for it will rise 
with income. The evidence in table 4.4,  which is  consistent with other 
findings that  memberships  in  voluntary  associations  rise  with  social 
class,’ suggests that this income effect outweighs the increase in the value 
of time. Similarly, volunteering appears to rise with family size despite the 
increase in the value of time, suggesting strongly that at least some volun- 
teer work has the effect of providing services to a family’s own children as 
well as to others. 
In addition to tabulations by other variables, it is instructive to examine 
the variation in volunteering among households. Since hours of  the day 
are distributed a good bit more equally than income, one would expect 
more uniformity in volunteering than in the giving of  dollars. It is by no 
7. Data reported by Warner and Lunt (1941, pp. 323-33)  in their study of an American 
community they called Yankee City suggest that membership in voluntary associations rose 
with social class. The percentages of each class belonging to three or more associations were: 
lower-lower: 7.2; upper-lower:  12.1; lower-middle: 20.1; upper-middle: 37.9; lower-upper: 
47.1; and upper-upper: 49.1. 148  Volunteer Effort 
Table 4.4  Adult Volunteers by Income and Household Size, 1982 
Percentage of Adults Who Volunteered 
More Than 36 Hours 
in the Previous 3 
During the Year  Months 
Household income 
Under $4,000 
$4,000 -  6,999 
$7,000 -  9,999 
$10,000 - 14,999 
$15,000-  19,999 


























Source: Gallup Organization  1981, pp. 19-21. 
Nore: Definition of volunteering includes informal helping as well  as work for organiza- 
tions. 
means obvious, however, whether the propensity to volunteer is more or 
less equally distributed than the propensity to give out of income. In order 
to describe how the extent of volunteering differs among households, ta- 
ble 4.5 presents the cumulative percentages for volunteer hours and num- 
ber of houieholds based on a weighted sample of 2436 households in 1973 
classified by amount of volunteering. Over 40 percent of households con- 
tributed no volunteer time at all. At the other end, the 8 percent of house- 
holds volunteering the most hours accounted for over half of all volunteer 
hours. Figure 4.1 presents the corresponding Lorenz curve, which plots 
the cumulative percentage of  households against the cumulative percent- 
age of volunteering. Shown by the solid line, this curve illustrates the un- 
evenness of volunteering in the population. For comparison, the compa- 
rable distribution of  monetary contributions by income is also plotted, 
using a dotted line. Based on the available data, these curves show that the 
propensity to contribute out of  income varies less over the population 
than the propensity to volunteer. The coefficients of  equality calculated 
from these data are 0.30 for contributions and 0.23 for volunteering.8  Be- 
cause incomes differ, of course, the distribution of  actual contributions 
by households is much less equal. 
8. “The coefficient of  equality” is defined as the ratio of  the area under the curve to the 
area of the complete triangle that contains it. The higher the value of the coefficient of equal- 
ity, the more even the distribution. Perfect equality would be signified by a coefficient value 
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Table 4.5  Distribution of Volunteer Hours by Households, 1973 (percentage) 
Volunteer Hours 
Unweighted 
Number of  Weighted Percentage of 












































Source: Tabulations from the National Study of  Philanthropy. 
n  c 
Fig. 4.1 
20  40  60  80  100 
Cumulative  Percentage  of  Households  (solid  line) 
and  Income (dotted line) 
Distribution  of  volunteering hours and contributions, 1973. 
Source: tables 2.3 and 4.5. 
A final empirical issue that can be addressed with simple tabulations is 
whether contributions of money tend to go with volunteering. The notion 
that “money follows inv~lvement,”~  or the reverse, concerns the comple- 
mentarity of the activities of contributing and volunteering. If people tend 
to do them together, stimulating one will also stimulate the other. If, on 
the other hand, contributions of time and money are substitutes, the en- 
9. See James E. Kemper, WaNStreet Journal, 22 December 1982, p. 20. 150  Volunteer Effort 
couragement of  one would tend to come at the expense of the other. The 
possibility of a complementary relationship appears to be supported by 
surveys that have found that giving money and time do in fact appear to 
go together. The Gallup survey in 1981 using the broader definition of vol- 
unteering found that 91 percent of those who volunteered also gave money, 
compared to only 66 percent among those who did not volunteer (Gallup 
Organization 1981, p. 23). More detail is available in the 1973 Michigan 
survey of philanthropy, which included questions about contributions of 
time and money. Table 4.6 is a tabulation from that survey showing aver- 
age hours of volunteer work for husbands and wives according to the cou- 
ple's  ratio of  contributions  to income.  With  few exceptions, the table 
shows that households contributing larger proportions of  their income 
also volunteered more."  In addition, this effect appears to be stronger for 
men than for women. Whereas husbands average fewer volunteer hours in 
the bottom four classes, their volunteering exceeds that of wives in the 
next four. While these results suggest that contributions of time and money 
are complementary, they are by no means definitive since other variables 
are not held constant. The issue of complementarity is addressed below in 
considering the effect of income taxation on volunteering. 
Table 4.6  Average Annual Volunteer Hours  by  Ratio of  Contributions  to In- 
come, Married Couples, 1973 
Ratio of Monetary 
Contributions to 
Incomea  Wife  Husband  Total  N 
3  24  20  44  85 
0-.02  43  38  81  798 
.02-.04  87  73  I60  3  70 
.04-.06  119  98  217  200 
.06-.08  143  125  269  87 
.08-. 10  138  151  289  80 
.lo-.I5  171  224  396  101 
.15-.20  169  181  350  45 
.20-.30  173  151  324  27 
.30-.50  227  205  432  19 
Greater than SO  I55  246  40 1  39 
TOTAL  1851 
~ 
Source: Tabulations from the National Study of  Philanthropy. 
Note: Intervals are inclusive of the upper limit. 
10. Morgan, Dye, and Hybels (1977, p. 174) present other tabulations supporting the same 
conclusion. 151  Volunteer Effort 
4.2  Tax Treatment of  Volunteer Services 
Two sets of provisions in the federal income tax relate to the contribu- 
tion of volunteer time: First, the tax provisions concerning deductions for 
charitable  contributions  affect  the  attractiveness  of  money  contribu- 
tions-the  alternative to volunteering-and  refer specifically to volunteer 
services. As outlined in chapter 2, the charitable deduction was available 
before 1982 for taxpayers who itemized their deductions but was extended 
to nonitemizers beginning only in 1983. The tax code explicitly excludes 
the value of services contributed to charitable organizations in describing 
deductible items. Contributions  of  blood are also excluded (1980 U.S. 
Master Tax Guide 1979, sec. 1141, p. 414). Most expenses incurred in vol- 
unteering are, however, deductible as part of  the charitable deduction. 
These include unreimbursed  costs of transportation, telephone,  meals, 
and lodging in connection with volunteer work. In contrast to deductions 
for business expenses, neither depreciation nor insurance costs are eligible 
for the charitable deduction. In addition, the mileage allowance is less 
than that allowed for business travel.” 
Second, the tax treatment of  volunteering is affected by more general 
provisions of the income tax, including the tax-rate schedule, the defini- 
tion of  taxable income, and special provisions for secondary earners. To 
the extent that volunteer activity is an alternative use of time to other non- 
market  activities and work,  the  definition of  taxable  income and  the 
schedule of tax rates are relevant to volunteering because they determine 
the income and substitution effects underlying a household’s allocation of 
time. Special provisions for secondary earners, in particular, may affect 
household decisions about volunteering.  Congress included in the  198 1 
tax cut a deduction for married couples for part of the second earner’s in- 
come. Beginning in 1983 the deduction is scheduled to be 10 percent of the 
earned income of the spouse with lower income up to $30,000 (US  Con- 
gress, Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation 1981, p. 35). Because this 
provision will  in many cases cause the tax rate faced by  the secondary 
earner to diverge from the tax rate at which contributions of money may 
be deducted, this special provision will tend to favor money gifts over con- 
tributions of time. In order to illustrate this and other tax effects on vol- 
unteering, it is useful to consider a simple example of a household’s choice 
between money contributions and volunteering. 
In assessing the tax treatment of volunteering, one question that can be 
raised concerns the neutrality of the tax system on treating gifts of money 
and time. That the tax law allows deductibility of  the former but not the 
latter has been criticized by some.” Long (1977) demonstrates, however, 
that this traditional tax treatment is neutral, at least for itemizers. An ex- 
11. In 1982,84 per mile. 
12. See, for example, Baird 1972. 152  Volunteer Effort 
ample will serve to illustrate this point. Consider a taxpayer who can make 
$10 by working another hour or can do an hour of volunteer work worth 
$10 to a charitable organization.  Under these circumstances the charity 
will receive $10 worth of  services whether the taxpayer volunteers for an 
hour or works an hour and contributes the proceeds. Neutrality would re- 
quire that the tax treatment leave the taxpayer as well-off in one situation 
as in the other. Table 4.7 summarizes the tax treatment of gifts of time and 
money. In all cases, volunteering has no effect on taxes or disposable in- 
come since it is neither taxed nor deducted. For taxpayers who itemize 
their deductions, as shown in line (a), contributing one’s earnings leaves 
taxes unchanged, the same as for volunteering. Thus the basic tax treat- 
ment of itemizers is neutral, which is Long’s (1977) central argument. 
The income tax was not neutral, however, in its treatment of contribu- 
tions by taxpayers who did not itemize their deductions. Because contri- 
butions were not deductible against earnings at the margin, the tax made 
volunteering more advantageous, other things equal. In order not to lose 
Table 4.7  Tax Treatment of Giving Money and Volunteering 




Additional  Tax Decrease  Tax 
Earnings  Due to Gift  Change 
Tax treatmept of earning and 
contributing $10; 30 percent 
marginal tax rate. 
Pre-1982 law 
(a) Itemizer 
(b)  Noniternizer 
Full charitable deduction for 
nonitemizers and deduction of 
10 percent for second-earner 
income (itemizers and 
nonitemizers) 
+  3.00 
+3.00 
-  3.00 
0 
0 
+  3.00 
(c) Primary earner works extra 
hour and contributes $10 
(d)  Secondary earner works 
extra hour and contributes 
$10 
Tax treatment of  volunteering 
one hour 
+  3.00  -  3.00 
+  2.70  -  3.00  - 
0  0 
0 
0.30 
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income,  a taxpayer at the 30  percent tax bracket,  for example, could 
choose between volunteering an hour or working an hour for $10, con- 
tributing $7 and keeping the remaining $3 to cover the increased taxes.I3 
When the above-the-line deduction for nonitemizers is fully implemented, 
this distortion will be eliminated. The actual effect of this new deduction 
will depend, of course, on whether volunteering is encouraged more by 
the complementarity effect through the price of money gifts than it is dis- 
couraged by the end of this distortion.14 
The new partial deduction allowed for the second earner will introduce 
a different distortion at the same time the itemizerhonitemizer distortion 
disappears. If the primary earner works an additional hour and contrib- 
utes the proceeds, the income tax will be neutral between gifts of time and 
money, as in line (a). If the gift comes from the secondary earner, however, 
giving money will be favored over volunteering. This distortion will not be 
large, of  course, because the difference between spouses’ marginal rates is 
small, being no higher than 5  percent when the basic tax rate is 50  percent. 
4.3  Theory of  Volunteer Work 
The theories of helping and charitable behavior discussed in chapter 2 
apply in much the same way to the contribution of time as to material 
gifts.  In analyzing  the  kinds  of  volunteer  work  typically  observed  in 
American communities, it is not uncommon to discover elements of en- 
joyment, altruism, and self-interested consumption of family services and 
training underlying that work. Table 4.8 summarizes the responses to a 
survey of adult lvolunteers taken in 1981. When asked why they first be- 
came involved in volunteering,  volunteers were most likely to say they 
wanted to  help others or do something useful. Manifestations of this im- 
pulse  range from the almost missionary fervor  of the early March of 
Dimes to the pragmatic “we do  it because it needs to be done.”” The next 
most frequent response given by volunteers in 1981 was that they had an 
interest in the work (35  percent). Twenty-nine percent said they felt needed or 
thought they would enjoy the work. Indeed, some volunteer activity ap- 
pears to include a not unsubstantial component of socializing and other 
13. It is worth noting that the example assumes that the taxpayer can choose to spend an 
additional hour working. In addition, actual choices between earning-giving and volunteer- 
ing would be affected by the taxpayer’s productivity in a marginal hour spent in each pursuit. 
In general, the benefit to the charity from volunteering and giving money must be compared 
along with the change in tax liability. The definition of neutrality, however, is independent of 
either of these assumptions. 
14. The theoretical analysis of this question is taken up in the next section. 
15. SeeSills 1957,p.241,andRaleighNewsandObserver,  13December 1981.ANewYork 
man who does health-related volunteer work expressed a similar sentiment: “I do all this to 
help people in trouble. I couldn’t pass anyone having a problem without doing something 
about it” (New York Times, 29 January 1977). 154  Volunteer Effort 




Wanted to do something useful; help others; 
Had an interest in the activity or work 
Thought I would enjoy doing the work; 
Had a child, relative, or friend who was 
do  good deeds for others 
feel needed 
involved in the activity or would benefit 
from it 
Religious concerns 
Wanted to learn and get experience; work 
Had a lot of free time 
Thought my volunteer work would help keep 
Other 
Don’t recall 
experience; help get a job 
taxes or other costs down 








Source: Gallup Organization  1981, p. 28. 
Note: Adults in this survey were asked: “For what reasons did you first become involved ir, 
this volunteer activity?” Percent total exceeds 100 because more than one response per ques- 
tion was allowed. 
enjoyment. For example, in a study of charitable activity in an English vil- 
lage, Obler (1981, p. 36) observes that 
private giving is an integral part of public, social life in Penridge. Hard- 
ly a week goes by when there is not a coffee morning, whist party, vil- 
lage fete, fashion show, concert, wine and cheese party, show and sell 
stall or an open garden day to raise money for some cause. 
The historical social-class homogeneity of  most voluntary  associations 
may be a further indication of the social aspect of some volunteering.I6 
Twenty-three percent of the 1981 sample of volunteers had a child, rela- 
tive, or friend involved in the activity or would benefit from it, suggesting 
a somewhat different consumption motive for volunteering. Twenty-one 
percent expressed a religious motivation, which could certainly be related 
to the most frequently given response described above. The final response 
named by more than 10 percent of the sample was a desire to obtain work 
16. Warner and Lunt (1941,  pp. 118, 303-33)  found that most voluntary associations in 
Yankee City were homogenous in social-class composition, with upper-class women domi- 
nating the membership rolls of charitable organizations. 155  Volunteer Effort 
experience (1  1 percent). Some volunteer coordinators have said that ca- 
reer aims are important for a growing number of  volunteers, particularly 
women who have been outside the labor force (New York Times, 29 Janu- 
ary 1977). 
There are, in short, several distinct classes of motivations for engaging 
in voluntary work. They may be summarized as a)  giving, b)  consuming, 
and c) investing. The giving component has much in common with contri- 
butions of material gifts, but the form of the gift may take on special sig- 
nificance, as noted below. 
Volunteering may have a consumption aspect to the extent that it pro- 
vides personal or family services or offers contact with others, camarade- 
rie, and interesting experiences. It may have an investment aspect to the 
extent that it offers experience that can be useful in the job market. Need- 
less to say, it is no more feasible to  quantify these components than to  dis- 
tinguish them from altruistic motives in observing actual volunteer behav- 
ior. That volunteering may be enjoyable or useful, however, suggests that 
theoretical models need to  incorporate  these possibilities. 
An individual often has the choice between contributing money or vol- 
unteering in support of a charitable organization’s programs. The analysis 
of  volunteering thus raises the question of what determines the form in 
which giving is carried out. To explain why individuals choose to volun- 
teer, two kinds of reasons may be offered. One is that, for some people, 
the very motivation for giving may be tied to a desire to be personally in- 
volved to  at least some extent with that giving. Such individuals would not 
be indifferent between contributing ten hours to a worthy cause and mak- 
ing a monetary, contribution that would buy the equivalent amount of 
work. Quite a different explanation is suggested by the “new home eco- 
nomics,” a body of theory that analyzes work in the home analogously to 
production in a firm, with home production being the function of  material 
inputs and the time of at least one household member. According to this 
view, volunteering and donations of money can be viewed as inputs in the 
nonmarket production of the good “giving and helping,” or “charity.” By 
implication, households derive satisfaction from the final “output” of the 
production process, not from the hours of  volunteer work or from the 
dollars of contributions.  While a desire for personal involvement-the 
first explanation-would  seem to place a lower limit on the amount of 
volunteering that an individual would find acceptable, the home-produc- 
tion model implies that a family’s mix of donations and volunteering will 
depend only on its relative efficiency in volunteering and the value of time 
of household members. 
4.3.1 
As in the case of monetary contributions, it is useful to analyze the ef- 
fect of taxes on volunteering in the context of a simplified economic model. 
Using this model, it is possible to distinguish several effects of an income 
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tax with a deduction for charitable contributions. Several issues are then 
dealt with in more detail, including the notion of “home production” of 
charity and the interaction between the time allocations of  husband and 
wife. 
Volunteering in a Simple Model of Giving 
It is straightforward to extend the basic neoclassical model of consumer 
behavior to explain contributions of money and volunteering. The indi- 
vidual may be viewed as choosing the desired amount of contributions, 
volunteering, and leisure subject to an exogenous wage rate and the total 
amount of time available. Appendix C presents such a model, in which the 
individual  values  contributions,  volunteering,  leisure,  and  purchased 
commodities. The individual in this model will volunteer until the valu- 
ation of a marginal hour of that activity equals the after-tax wage rate, the 
same condition applying to  the allocation of time for leisure. 
This analysis implies that taxes can affect volunteering in several ways. 
First, any income effect of taxes will affect the marginal utility of income. 
A tax increase lowers net income and raises the marginal utility of income, 
thus reducing the equilibrium amount of  volunteering. This implies that 
empirical work should account for the effect of total tax liability on  net in- 
come. Second, changes in the marginal tax rate influence volunteering by 
changing the shadow price of time. An increase in the marginal tax rate re- 
duces the opportunity cost of volunteering and thus tends to  increase vol- 
unteering. Finally, tax rules may affect the marginal utility of volunteer- 
ing. One important way of doing this is by reducing the price of making 
donations of money. If donations and volunteering are complementary 
goods in the economic sense, reducing the price of one of them will tend to 
increase demand for the other. 
The question of complementarity takes on central importance in con- 
sidering whether U.S.  tax laws have encouraged or discouraged volunteer- 
ing. Since, on the one hand, the charitable deduction makes contributions 
of  money less expensive relative to volunteering, one might suppose that 
volunteering would be discouraged, as compared to what they might have 
been without the deduction. But complementarity raises the opposite pos- 
sibility. If contributions of money and time are complementary activities, 
the stimulation of the former through the charitable deduction would also 
encourage the latter. 
Donations and  Volunteering as Inputs to “Charity” 
One important distinction to be made with regard to this general model 
is whether individuals place a value on the hours of volunteering they do, 
or whether they simply value the resulting charitable services that result. 
If one is willing to  assume that individuals do not place such a value per se 
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viewing donations and volunteering simply as two inputs used in produc- 
ing the composite commodity, “charity.” In this model the choice between 
donations and volunteering is assumed to be separated from other alloca- 
tion decisions.”  In the absence of the charitable deduction, the budget 
line is KL, with slope (I-t)w,  as shown in figure 4.2. Allowing a full deduc- 
tion for money donations changes the slope of the budget set from w(1-t) 
to w.  Clearly there is a substitution effect in favor of  donations, shown 
here by the decrease in volunteering between points  CI and b. This is the 
detrimental effect of the deduction on volunteering. However, the income 
effect may outweigh this effect. If the amount of full income spent on 
charity remains a constant, the budget line becomes JL. If the deduction 
causes the individual to increase his total outlay for charity, however, the 
budget line would shift further out, say to  J’L’  .  As drawn, this income ef- 
fect dominates the substitution effect, and volunteering increases as a re- 
sult of the deduction. Whether the income effect outweighs the detrimen- 
tal substitution effect in general will  be determined by two aspects of 
preferences: the “complementarity” of  donations and volunteering, as 
shown by the curvature of the indifference curves, and the income elastic- 
ity of volunteering.  If  donations and volunteering were perfect substi- 
tutes, with indifference curves being straight lines, the deduction could 
cause the individual to switch entirely from volunteering to donations. Or, 
if  volunteering were an inferior good (or had zero income elasticity), the 
0  L  L‘ 
Hours  of  Volunteering  (H,) 
Fig. 4.2  Deductibility  of  contributions  and  individual  volunteering. 
KL: no deductibility; slope = w(1-t).  JL: deductibility; slope 
= w.  J’L  ’  :  deductibility with increase in budget for charity. 
17. Separability implies that the marginal rate of  substitution between volunteering and 
donations is not affected by the amount of other goods consumed. See Appendix C. 158  Volunteer Effort 
deduction would decrease volunteering. In general, however, the effects 
of the deduction are unclear in theory, and it is necessary to turn to empiri- 
cal work to assess the effect of the charitable deduction on volunteering.Is 
Volunteering in a Model of the Household 
One important feature missing from models of individual behavior is 
the possibility of interactions in volunteering among household members. 
Gronau  (1973) presents a model in which husband and wife maximize 
household utility subject to time constraints. Where production is of the 
fixed-proportion  form and each spouse has marginal cost functions de- 
pending on their  shadow wage and the price of  purchased inputs, the 
household’s optimal allocation involves letting the lower-cost spouse do 
the production of a given household good. Gronau distinguishes between 
households in which both spouses work in the market and those in which 
only the husband works in the market. Because of the complexity of the 
various combinations of work, leisure, and home production, I focus here 
and in part 4.4 of this chapter on the important case in which only the hus- 
band works in the market. One reason for doing this is that it allows a 
straightforward  test  of  the complementarity  hypothesis.  By  observing 
nonworking wives in households with different prices for donations, it is 
possible to estimate the cross-price effect on the amount of volunteering. 
If one views volunteering as one form of home production, Gronau’s 
analysis (p. 641)  implies that the effect of an exogenous increase in house- 
hold income on the family’s allocation of time between leisure, volunteer- 
ing, and other home production will depend on the time-intensity of each 
activity, the income elasticity of each activity, and the substitutability of 
each spouse’s leisure and volunteering,  home production,  and  market 
goods. The increase in income will increase the value of  the wife’s time, 
but the net effect on her time allocation is uncertain. 
Simultaneous versus Sequential 7ime Allocation 
The neoclassical theory of the allocation of time described in this sec- 
tion pictures the individual or household making simultaneous decisions 
about how much time to spend in work, volunteering, home production, 
18. A similar model is suggested by the theory of  “home production.” In this framework, 
volunteering-like  other uses of nonworking time-is  merely an input in the production of 
“homemade” commodities. Following Gronau’s (1973) formulation, the household might 
value goods Z1, . . . ,  Z,, each of which is subject to production functions of the form 2, = 
Z,(X,, HI),  where XI is a market good and HI  is hours devoted to home production of  Z,. 
Gronau assumes fixed-proportions technology so that the marginal cost of producing Z,  is 
MC, = u,P, + b,w*,  where PI  is the price of XI, w* is the shadow price of time, and (I,  and b, 
are  constants. Applying this assumption to the production of charity gives the marginal cost 
as  MC = UP  + bw*, where P is the tax-defined price of  making monetary donations. The 
assumption of fixed-proportion technology is, of  course, the extreme of  complementarity 
and was used only to highlight the possibilities for intrafamily allocations of  time. In any 
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and leisure as well as how to  spend money earnings. It is worth noting a se- 
quential model in which some of these decisions are made before others. 
Specifically, it may be that the household first chooses the hours of mar- 
ket work, and only then decides how to allocate nonmarket work time be- 
tween leisure,  volunteering,  and  home production.  To the extent that 
these nonmarket activities are similar to each other and hours of  market 
work are often inflexible, this may be a reasonable model. If so, it high- 
lights the importance of income taxation on labor supply as a determinant 
of volunteer effort. This model is considered further in section 4.5. 
4.4  Empirical Analysis Related to Volunteer Work 
In terms of the neoclassical model of time allocation, income taxation 
has three distinct effects on the supply of volunteer behavior by  house- 
holds. First, the income tax obviously affects disposable income and thus 
the demand for leisure and other forms of consumption. Second, the mar- 
ginal tax rate has a substitution effect which affects the relative attractive- 
ness of another hour spent in working, volunteering, or some other activ- 
ity. Together, these effects may be quite important in determining whether 
individuals will participate in the labor market and how much they will 
work. These decisions obviously bear directly on the time available for 
volunteering. Whether they are made prior to or jointly with decisions to 
volunteer is unclear, however. Third, the deductibility of contributions of 
money and the marginal tax rate together determine the price of such con- 
tributions relative to consumption expenditures. What effect  this price 
has on volunteering depends in part on whether contributions of time and 
money are complements or substitutes.19 
Since market work is a principal competitor for the time available to in- 
dividuals, this section begins with a brief review of empirical evidence on 
the effect of income taxes on labor supply. It then proceeds to a descrip- 
tion of empirical work focusing directly on volunteering. 
4.4.1  Taxes and Labor Supply 
The effect of income taxation on labor force participation and work ef- 
fort has been a topic of great importance in public finance long before the 
emergence of “supply-side” economics. The theory underlying most em- 
pirical work embodied three principal assumptions: individuals have pref- 
erences for “leisure”  (nonworking time) and market  goods,  they may 
work any number of hours within their time constraint, and they respond 
the same to a change in the net wage whether it is caused by a change in the 
gross wage or the tax rate. In the empirical work on labor supply, atten- 
tion has been focused on labor force participation and hours of market 
19. See section 4.3 for an explanation of these terms. 160  Volunteer Effort 
work. Little attention has been paid to  the allocation of time not spent in 
market work-the  amalgam labeled  “leisure. ” Following the economic 
theory of an individual’s choice between leisure and other consumption, 
an income tax is shown to have an income effect and a substitution effect. 
Since leisure is a normal good, increasing the tax lowers disposable in- 
come and tends to  increase work effort. The substitution effect, by lower- 
ing the net wage, goes in the opposite direction, discouraging market 
work.Zo  Which effect dominates depends, of course, on the nature of pref- 
erences and the structure of the income tax. Empirical estimation is re- 
quired. 
In an early study, Break (1957) concluded that taxes had little effect on 
the labor supply of men. Increasingly sophisticated analyses since then 
have yielded much the same conclusion. Kosters (1969), for example, ob- 
tained very small estimates of the uncompensated labor supply for men- 
in the range of -0.04 to -0.09. Hausman’s (1981) recent work also implies 
an uncompensated labor-supply elasticity for men around zero, although 
Hausman’s  findings  imply larger  income and substitution effects than 
those of previous studies. In contrast, most empirical analysis of the labor 
supply of women implies a relatively high degree of  sensitivity to income 
taxes. Hausman, for example, finds uncompensated wage elasticities on 
the order of +  0.5 for female heads of households and + 1 .O for wives, im- 
plying a much greater importance for income taxation. The potential in- 
come effect of taxation on the labor supply of married women with chil- 
dren is illustrated in table 4.9, which shows market participation rates for 
women as a function of husband’s income and education. In general, as 
the incomes of husbands rise, the proportion of  wives who work in the la- 
bor force declines markedly. Although this suggests nothing about the di- 
vision of  time spent outside of the labor force, it certainly demonstrates 
that important differences exist in the amount of time available for volun- 
teer work. 
4.4.2  Empirical Analysis of Volunteering 
In assessing explicit analyses of volunteering, it is useful to relate theo- 
retical models of individual behavior to empirical analysis, discuss the 
data and models used in previous analyses, and describe the results of 
those analyses. 
20. The effect of a proportional income tax can be written: 
where L is hours of  work, t is the tax rate, S  is the income-compensated wage effect on labor, 
w is the gross wage, and y is total income. The first term on the right-hand side corresponds 
to the substitution effect of the tax, and the second to the income effect. See, for example, 
Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980, pp. 23-61. 161  Volunteer Effort 
Table 4.9  Labor Force Participation Rates of Married Women with Children un- 
der 18, by  Years  of  Schooling Completed and Income of  Husband, 
1978 
Totala  Years of School Completed by Wife 
Husband’s Income,  Participation 




Under $3,000  49.2  36.1  56.0  - 
$3,000 to 4,999  50.8  41.6  55.8  - 
$5,000 to 6,999  50.6  42.9  56.1  - 
$7,000 to 9,999  54.9  48.6  56.8  75.6 
$10,000 to 12,999  56.7  49.4  56.4  68.5 
$13,000 to 14,999  54.6  44.3  54.9  58.2 
$15,000 to 19,999  51.3  39.8  51.7  55.2 
$20,000 to 24,999  46.1  36.4  44.6  49.5 
$25,000 to 34,999  40.3  33.3  34.4  48.5 
$35,000 to 49,999  26.7  -  35.8  46.8 
$50,000 or more  26.7  -  23.7  24.6 
b 
b 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 1979, pp. A33-A34,  table 14. 
Note:  Labor force is given as percentage of population. 
aTotal includes wives with other amounts of schooling than shown separately. 
bBase  is less than 75,000 persons. 
Models for Estimation 
for estimating the effect of taxes on volunteering is given by: 
Based on the theoretical discussion in section 4.3, an empirical model 
(1)  Hv  = f  (w*(l- t),  Z?  Yf  - I: Z), 
where H,  is hours of volunteer work, w*(l -  t)  is the net-of-tax wage rate, 
Pis  the net price of giving a dollar in contributions, Yfis “full income,” T 
is taxes, and 2  is a vector of household characteristics such as age, family 
composition, and education. This function is interpreted as a supply func- 
tion for volunteer effort. It can be estimated from available data without 
reference to demand by assuming that the demand for volunteer service is 
perfectly elastic at the going price of zero. 
Two “prices” are important in this supply function. To the extent that 
individuals can choose the number  of  hours they work, the net-of-tax 
wage represents the opportunity cost of spending an hour doing (unpaid) 
volunteer work. For those who are not working at all, w*  in this ideal 
model is the gross “reservation wage” necessary to entice them to work. 
Since giving money is obviously a substitute for giving time, the price of 
money gifts P is included to reflect the cross-price effect on volunteering 
while w*(l -  t)  is the “own-price” of volunteering. 
Full income measures potential income for some given amount of work 
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empirical work on the supply of labor suggests that leisure is a normal 
good. This finding provides no guidance, however, as to how the demand 
for volunteer activity changes when income changes. Finally, a model of 
volunteer work should contain a set of variables designed to account for 
demographic characteristics likely to influence the desire or ability to do 
volunteer work. The information presented at the beginning of this chap- 
ter suggests, for example, that volunteering varies by age, sex, and family 
composition as well as income. As in any econometric analysis, it is im- 
portant to account for other potentially important variables in order to 
isolate as much as possible the independent effect of the variable of inter- 
est-in  this case, taxes. 
Econometric Problems 
The estimation of this ideal model is difficult in practice owing to the 
complexity of the allocation process within households and shortcomings 
in available data. One of several alternative models might be used to ex- 
plain the allocation of time within a household. In its most general form, a 
model might allow for the simultaneous determination of  hours of work 
and volunteering for each member of a household, or at least each adult 
member.21  In order to estimate such a model, it would be necessary to have 
not only the hours of work and volunteering for each adult but also a 
wage rate for each. In practice, wage rates of working couples are often 
not recorded separately for both spouses, and reservation wages are, by 
their nature, unobserved. As has been spelled out in the recent economet- 
ric literature, restricting the sample to those with observed wages will in- 
troduce sample selection bias into the estimates.  22 Even the observed wage 
may not be a wholly appropriate measure of the potential wage. As Lewis 
(1969) has pointed  out, the wage may be a function of the number of 
hours worked, making wages earned by part-time workers suspect. In ad- 
dition, wages may reflect conditions of the workplace, making a determi- 
nation of the potential wage or full income problematic. 
One simplification that can be made in this general model is to assume a 
recursive structure, whereby decisions to work or not precede the deci- 
sions about how much to work and whether and how much to volunteer. 
In this  model taxes would  be  a determinant  of  the number  of  hours 
worked, leaving remaining hours to be divided between volunteering and 
other activities that can be lumped together as “leisure,” though the latter 
includes household work. Since neither volunteering nor leisure provide 
monetary income, the marginal tax rate (through the net wage) would not 
affect the choice between them. The price of  cash gifts would, however, 
affect volunteering through its cross-price effect, as above. In this recur- 
21. For models of household decision making, see Becker 1974. 
22. For a discussion of this problem, see Heckman and MaCurdy 1980. 163  Volunteer Effort 
sive model, the primary influence of taxes on volunteering would be seen 
in the determination of hours of work. How the nonwork time is split be- 
tween volunteering and leisure depends on the income elasticity of each 
and the cross-price effect between the price of donations and volunteering. 
Data on  Volunteer Work 
Household surveys provide the most important source of data on vol- 
unteer activity. Since 1965 several national surveys (U.S. Department of 
Labor 1969; Gallup Organization 1981) have been performed with the pri- 
mary objective of estimating the amount and kind of volunteer work per- 
formed in the United States. Questions on volunteering have also been in- 
cluded in other surveys.23  As reflected in the first section of this chapter, 
however, these surveys have differed in many respects, including the very 
measure of  volunteer activity. Respondents were asked whether they par- 
ticipate in certain volunteer activities and how many hours they spend. 
The surveys differed, however, in both the time period covered and the 
kinds  of  activities counted  as volunteering.  The time  period  covered 
ranges from the previous week to the previous year. As for the definition 
of volunteer activity, surveys differ in their inclusion of volunteering for 
religious  organizations  and  informal  volunteering,  such  as  helping  a 
neighbor move. 
The data set with the most complete information on tax-related vari- 
ables is the National Study of Philanthropy undertaken by the Census Bu- 
reau and the University of Michigan’s Survey Research Center.24  The sam- 
ple  included  over  2800  households,  selected  so  as  to  oversample 
households with high incomes. The survey asked about volunteer activity 
of  husband and wife during the year 1973, and this activity was broken 
down by type of organization served. Data on labor force participation, 
household  income, and tax status are included, but it is  impossible to 
identify the wage rates of both spouses in two-earner couples. 
A major advantage of the National Study of  Philanthropy is the infor- 
mation available on income taxes. Since respondents were asked whether 
or not they itemized, it is possible with some reliance to calculate the price 
of giving for almost all the sample. The only major problem is those tax- 
payers who are on the “borderline” between itemizing and not itemizing 
and who would, in fact, not have found it advantageous to itemize if their 
charitable contributions had been zero. The presence of  these taxpayers 
requires special attention. With the exception of the study by Mueller dis- 
cussed below,,  all of  the econometric studies of volunteering done to date 
have employed this data set. 
23. See, for example Morgan, Dye, and Hybels 1977. 
24. For a full description, see Morgan, Dye, and Hybels 1977. 164  Volunteer Effort 
Econometric Studies 
Three previous econometric analyses of volunteering have been identi- 
fied and are described here. The first is that of Mueller (1975).*’ The data 
were based on a 1963 survey of 310 women who had graduated from Co- 
lumbia between 1945 and 1951. Although the survey contained no ques- 
tions about taxes, important social and economic information was avail- 
able. In particular, information on the respondent’s current or last market 
wage, husband’s income, age of children, religion, and size of community 
was included. In addition, Mueller added two variables intended to ac- 
count for volunteer work done in anticipation of gaining useful job-related 
skills. One is the average comparable market wage for the kind of volun- 
teer work being done, and the other is a dummy variable signifying the re- 
spondent’s desire to look for a job. Using ordinary least squares, Mueller 
estimated equations explaining total hours of volunteer work and hours 
of  volunteer work other than for professional societies. Neither the hus- 
band’s income nor the gross wage are significant in explaining volunteer 
hours. These results suggest that volunteering is unlike leisure, which is re- 
sponsive to the wage and income elastic. Instead, Mueller argues, the re- 
sults suggest that women engage in volunteering because it will give them 
valuable skills rather than because it is enjoyable. Supporting this notion, 
Mueller found that women volunteered more if they performed jobs with 
high market wages and if they planned to return to work. These findings 
could merely suggest, however, that interesting volunteer jobs elicit more 
effort and that volunteer jobs meet similar personal needs as market jobs. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that the potential for strong tax ef- 
fects throbgh income or wage rates is limited. 
Among the other explanatory variables, identifying with a major reli- 
gious faith was positively associated with volunteer work. Whether reli- 
gious women volunteer  more in nonreligious organizations is  unclear, 
however. Size of community also had a significant effect. Women in small 
towns and rural areas volunteered the most. The number of children or 
the presence of young children were not significant variables. 
The second study of volunteer effort, by Dye (1980), was the first to ex- 
amine explicitly the effect of taxes. By including the price of giving money 
as an explanatory variable, Dye was able to focus on the question of 
whether volunteering is a substitute or a complement for contributions of 
money. This empirical question is one of the most important in evaluating 
the effect of taxes on volunteering. 
25. Havrilesky, Schweitzer, and Wright (1973) analyzed some aggregate data on volunteers 
for environmental groups. Data on income and wages were not included, and no variables 
were significant at the 95 percent level in explaining median hours of volunteered time. The 
authors did find, however, that volunteering was greatest in areas with the poorest environ- 
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As the first researcher to use the National Study of Philanthropy, Dye 
was able to calculate the net price of giving using data for individual 
households.  Equations were estimated in two stages. The first explains 
whether households volunteered at all, and the second explains hours of 
volunteering by the household. While this procedure is not ideal from an 
econometric point of  view,  26 it points up two rather distinct components 
to the volunteering decision, comparable to the participation and hours of 
work components in labor supply. In his basic equations Dye considers 
volunteering for the entire household together, though he notes that simi- 
lar results were obtained from individuals. In both stages volunteering is 
explained by the logarithm of the price of money gifts, net income, and 
wealth and by dummy variables for education, age, and marital status. 
Dye found that volunteering increases with education and wealth, is higher 
for married couples, and is lower for those over 65. 
Volunteering in Dye’s equations is negatively associated with the price 
of giving money, suggesting that volunteering and monetary contributions 
are gross complements. Taken together, his equations imply a cross-price 
elasticity of -0.83. If correct, this finding would imply that policies lower- 
ing the price of contributions will encourage volunteering. In other words, 
the  tendency  for  both  kinds  of  contributions  to  be  done  together 
outweighs any tendency to substitute one form for another. As strong as 
this complementarity appears to be, however, one weakness in Dye’s em- 
pirical model is the absence of a net wage. As noted above, the measure- 
ment of the net wage for households is greatly complicated by the fact that 
wages cannot be observed for those who do not work. Nonetheless, the 
omission of this variable may bias the cross-price effect. For example, if 
the price of contributions is positively correlated to the net wage, the neg- 
ative effect for the price of contributions may result partly from an omit- 
ted net wage that would have had a similar negative effect if included. If 
price and the net wage are negatively related, the estimated price effect 
would, in absolute value, be an underestimate. 
In the third econometric study, Menchik and Weisbrod (1981; 1982) 
used the same survey data to estimate a more complete model of volunteer 
work. By including the net wage as an explanatory variable, they are able 
to reflect the choice between market work and volunteering. Since the net 
wage  is the opportunity cost of volunteering, a straightforward model 
such as that described in Appendix C predicts that a rise in the net wage 
will discourage volunteering as long as the substitution effect dominates 
the income effect. The addition of the net wage required a restriction in 
the sample used, however. Since the Michigan survey data does not pro- 
26. As Dye suggests, Tobit would be appropriate, as would logit or probit for the first 
stage and some method that accounts for sample selection in the second. 166  Volunteer Effort 
vide separate data on the wages of working spouses, wages could be ap- 
proximated from family income only for households with one earner.*’ 
Consequently, Menchik and Weisbrod analyzed the volunteer activity of 
working adults in single-earner households. Volunteering by spouses not 
in the labor force as well as by two-earner households was not considered 
in the study.28 
A second important feature of the Menchik-Weisbrod study is the re- 
placement of reported income by “full income,” the income that would 
have been earned if the earner had worked full-time. Because it is indepen- 
dent of the labor supply of the worker, it is considered an exogenous vari- 
able. The tax and marginal-tax-rate variables are also calculated using full 
income. The only drawback to this procedure is that it assumes that par- 
ticipation decisions-specifically,  the decision of nonworking spouses not 
to work-are  independent  of taxes. The importance of  the bias intro- 
duced by such treatment is, however, unclear. 
Menchik and Weisbrod also include a variety of explanatory variables 
measuring characteristics  of  the household  and local area. Their  1982 
study reports Tobit estimates of equations explaining hours of volunteer- 
ing as a function of the net wage, the price of contributing money, and full 
income as well as local government expenditures, sex, marital status, the 
presence of  children  in the household,  age entered  quadratically, and 
dummy variables for size of community, parental characteristics, and in- 
formal helping activity. 
Table 4.10 summarizes their basic estimates for total volunteering. The 
sample  used  for  estimation  excludes  households  with  incomes  over 
$50,000. The most striking finding is that the net wage has a positive and 
significant coefficient, contrary to the expected negative effect. Menchik 
and Weisbrod (1982, p. 24) explain this by noting the possibility that vol- 
unteering is undertaken primarily as an investment in human capital, not 
as a “consumption” activity like leisure. If the return to this kind of  in- 
vestment is correlated with the net wage, volunteering could rise with the 
net wage. They find further support for the investment model in the insig- 
nificant sign of full income; a positive effect would be expected under the 
consumption model of vol~nteering.~~  The price of making monetary do- 
nations is insignificant. Thus no support is provided either for Dye’s con- 
27. They approxiniated the hourly wage by 
w = (Y -  CriAl)/H, 
I 
where Y is total income, Ajis the holding in asset of type i, r,  is that asset’s rate of return, and 
His  approximate annual hours of work. Savings accounts and bonds were assigned a rate of 
return of 7 percent, while stocks and other assets were assumed to have a rate of  3 percent. 
28. Menchik and Weisbrod (1981, p. 169n)  also note that this sample selection rule may in- 
troduce statistical bias as well to the extent that workers are systematically different from 
those not in the labor market. 
29. This expectation assumes volunteering to be a normal good. 167  Volunteer Effort 
Table 4.10  Menchik-Weisbrod  Equation Explaining Hours of Volunteer Work 
Estimated 
Explanatory Variables  Coefficients 
Constant 
Net wage 













Parents attended religious services 
Father completed high school 










-  59.9a 
-  38.6 
-  100.9 
34.2 







Source: Menchik and Weisbrod 1982, p. 25. 
Note:  The sample included 816 observations of households with incomes of $50,000 or less. 
The method of estimation was Tobit. 
aSignificant at 95 percent level. 
clusions that gilring time and money are complementary or for the alterna- 
tive hypothesis that they are substitutes. 
4.5  Further Analysis: Explaining Volunteering by Women 
This section extends previous empirical work by focusing on volunteer- 
ing by women. As shown in tables 4.1 and 4.2, women volunteer more of- 
ten thkn men. Yet analysis on working adults in single-earner households, 
such as the Menchik-Weisbrod study, virtually ignores the volunteer be- 
havior of women. An important drawback to this approach is that, for 
most  women  in  the  philanthropy  survey,  neither  wages  nor  potential 
wages can be appr~ximated.~~  Therefore, it is impossible to apply the neo- 
classical model of simultaneous time allocation, described above in section 
4.3. 
30. For a description of  Menchik and Weisbrod’s (1981) method of approximating wages 
for single-earner households, see their section D and footnote 27. Because income is not re- 
ported separately for spouses, it is impossible to obtain wage estimates for two-earner house- 
holds. 168  Volunteer Effort 
A  sequential  variation  of  the  full  neoclassical model is,  therefore, 
adopted in this section. It is assumed that, for women, the labor-force- 
participation decision is  made prior to the parceling up of  nonmarket 
work time between “home production,”  volunteering, and leisure. As a 
consequence, the allocation of time by women becomes a recursive pro- 
cess, with the volunteering decision following the labor-force-participa- 
tion decision. In this model taxes have two important effects on volunteer- 
ing: the effect on participation and the effect on time allocation given the 
participation decision. A more restrictive form of this model would be 
that hours of work are also determined prior to the allocation of nonwork 
time, but this assumption will be used only as one alternative in this sec- 
tion. The assumption that the participation decision comes prior to the 
volunteering decision does not seem unreasonable, given the large number 
of women who choose to remain out of the labor market for long periods 
during their lives. Still, the recursive model used here is largely an assump- 
tion of convenience, made necessary by the lack of appropriate labor mar- 
ket data for most women. 
Equations explaining the decision to volunteer as well as the number of 
hours of volunteering per year for women were estimated using the same 
National Study of Philanthropy. Equations (A) and (C) in table 4.11 give 
the estimated  coefficients of  a set of  explanatory  variables measuring 
household net income, net price of  making donations, age, the presence 
of  children, education, family background, and newness in the neighbor- 
hood. Equation (A), which explains volunteering as a dichotomous vari- 
able, is  estimated  by the logit maximum-likelihood procedure.  Corre- 
sponding to the tabulation in table 4.2, volunteering rises and then falls 
with age in equation (A). Volunteering is  higher for women with more 
children under 18 at home, suggesting that a mother’s involvement with 
child-related activities increases the likelihood that she will become a vol- 
unteer. The estimated coefficients of the education terms suggest, as has 
previous analysis, that women’s volunteering increases with education. 
Finally, the negative effect of  the net price of  donations supports the hy- 
pothesis of complementarity between donations and volunteering. 
Equation (C), explaining hours of volunteer work, is estimated by the 
Tobit maximum-likelihood method. It shows significant coefficients only 
for the presence of a small child (negative) and college education (posi- 
tive). The coefficient of price is  negative, but not significantly different 
from zero at the 95 percent level (t = 1  .O). The point estimate of the coef- 
ficient implies a cross-price elasticity of -  0.25 for expected hours of vol- 
unteering,  calculated at the mean number  of  hours.31  These equations 
31. The elasticity is F(z)  (b/H),  where F(z)  is the predicted probability of positive hours of 
volunteering (0.499), b is the coefficient of  the price term (- 52.3), and His  the mean num- 
ber of hours of volunteering (103.4). 169  Volunteer Effort 
Table 4.11  Volunteering by Women 
Volunteering  Annual Hours of 
(dichotomous)  Volunteer Work 
Logit  Tobit 
(A)  (B)  (C)  (D) 
Women  Women 
Explanatory  Not  All  Not  All 
Variable  Employed  Women  Employed  Women 
Log of net income 
Log of price 
Age 
(Age)* 
Children under 18 
Children under 5 
High school graduate 
College graduate 
Parents contributed 
New in neighborhood 
Hours of market work 
Intercept 
-  0.00241 







-  0.266 
-  3.43a 
-0.138 
- 
-  0.0388 







-  0.256 
-  0.006Na 





-  64.8a 
104.a 
191.a 
-  52.3 









-  1.77 
94.1a 
169.a 
-  3.44 
-  1.82 
-  1 .27a 
-  79.6a 
- 783.a 
Source: National Study of Philanthropy 1973. 
Note: The sample size was 1122  in equations (A) and (C) and 2323 in equations (B)  and (D). 
The predicted probability of observing volunteering (F(z))  was 0.499  and 0.314  in equations 
(C) and (D), respectively. 
aSignificantly  different from zero at 95  percent level. 
provide only mixed support for the hypothesis of a complementarity ef- 
fect of the charitable deduction on volunteering. To reiterate, both equa- 
tions (A) and (C) rest on the assumption that participation decisions are 
made prior to volunteering decisions, thus making it possible to restrict 
the examination to those not in the labor market. While the behavior of 
this sample may differ from that of  working women, this assumption, if 
correct, would imply that there is no simultaneity bias due to the endogen- 
eity of the participation decision. 
The much stronger assumption that hours of market work are predeter- 
mined is embodied in equations (B) and (D), which include women both in 
and out of the labor force. The estimated effects in general are similar to 
those in equations (A) and (B). In addition, the hours of market-work 
variable exerts a negative and significant effect on  volunteering. The point 
estimate in equation (D) implies that volunteer  hours will  be reduced 
about eight hours for every ten additional hours of market work, suggest- 
ing that volunteering will take most of  the brunt of  increases in women’s 
hours of  market work. Because adequate wage data are not available for 
most women, however, it is impossible to estimate a complete model that 
accounts for simultaneous choice of hours of volunteering and market 170  Volunteer Effort 
work. The price of contributions is significant in both equations. In equa- 
tion (D), the cross-price elasticity is -  0.35.32  This point estimate implies 
that a 10 percent decrease in the price of giving, say from .60 to .54, would 
cause a 3.5 percent increase in the expected amount of volunteering. 
4.6  Conclusion 
In summary, the income tax appears to influence volunteering by af- 
fecting both participation choices and the division of  nonmarket  work 
time. The hypothesis that giving time and giving money are complemen- 
tary activities receives some support in each analysis of the National Sur- 
vey  of Philanthropy. While the findings are not everywhere statistically 
significant and are based on only one data set, the findings are reasonably 
consistent with each other. If  correct, these findings suggest that the tax 
system has a much more pervasive effect on behavior than what can be ob- 
served in contributions alone. They suggest that the tax system indirectly 
encourages involvement in charitable organizations by providing an ex- 
plicit incentive for only one form of  involvement. The work of  religious 
and charitable organizations appears to use people’s time and money to- 
gether. While the proportions obviously vary from person to person and 
from organization to organization, neither alone is as useful as both together. 
If the United States is, as de Tocqueville observed, a nation of joiners and 
voluntary associations (de Tocqueville 1835), then the tax system, through 
its deductions for charitable contributions, appears to foster that quality. 
It is not unreasonable to suppose that the extension of the deduction to 
nonitemizers will further encourage involvement in and volunteer work 
for charitable organizations. Informal volunteering and helping behavior 
may be encouraged as well. 
32. The elasticity is again calculated at the mean number of annual hours of volunteering 
for the sample which is 71.3. 